In this essay the question of what kind of conflicts are at stake in the context of European pluralism will be considered, with special focus on the shift from "conflicts by divergence" to "conflicts by convergence" and on attempts to conceptualise these issues by means of the concept of "complex antinomy". It will be argued that this analysis needs some refinement and the concept of "levels of disagreements" will be introduced as an alternative. A specific focus will be maintained on the impact of different interpretive methodologies: in this way it is possible to underline the structure of "deep" and "superficial" disagreements in the context of European law. In order to illustrate this point, some notes on the recent Taricco saga will be developed. Finally, the relevance for European constitutionalism of deep disagreements on interpretive methodologies will be underlined.
Introduction
The nature of contemporary European Public law as a quite peculiar, almost mysterious legal system is almost common knowledge among lawyers. The interlocking of several systems, both national and supranational, challenges our traditional understanding.
For instance, the classical Kelsenian model, i.e. the pyramid of hierarchically ordered norms and authorities I is clearly insufficient to conceptualize the complex entanglement between the European Union and national legal systems, as a widespread literature on "legal pluralism" II has often underlined.
This essay does not attempt to give a comprehensive solution to these questions: here the focus will be on a specific issue, namely the kind of conflict determined by the overlap of principles between national and supranational levels. It will be pointed out that the continuous extension of EU norms in the field of fundamental rights has inevitably created an interlaced zone between national and supranational norms on rights. Scholars have duly captured this point and proposed an account of these conflicts through the notion of "complex antinomy". The leading question of this essay is whether this conceptualisation is correct overall or whether it is possible to develop a more perspicuous representation of this kind of conflict.
In section 2 the shift in the European context from conflicts due to absence of a common ground (conflicts by divergence) to conflicts caused by its existence (conflicts by convergence) will be briefly considered. In section 3 the idea of "complex antinomy"
previously proposed in academic literature to conceptualize this topic will be scrutinized and some crucial difficulties will be underlined. In section 4 a more comprehensive account will be proposed, based on the notion of "levels of disagreements" in constitutional law.
This concept will be further developed in section 5 where the Taricco saga will be employed as an example of constitutional conflict due to convergence and an account of it based on the notion of "levels of disagreement" will be furnished.
As a result, hopefully, a single tile of a much wider mosaic representing the silent but stunning clash of lato sensu political forces underlying legal debate on European and national rights will be set.
Conflicts in Europe: from Divergence to Convergence
The history of European Public law is an affair of perennial conflict both "inside" EU law and between EU and National law, thus generating an antinomy, a conflict between two rules.
III
The internal conflict is of course at stake when we consider norms that would clearly be considered by any lawyer as belonging to the EU legal system. Opinion 2/13 of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), harshly confronting the principle of autonomy of EU law with its "opening" towards the European Convention on Human Rights, IV is an example in this sense. V Autonomy in the end prevailed, but it is hard to deny that the opinion showed a deep and crucial case of conflicting principles inside EU law. The principles at stake are clearly EU norms, typical of the European legal system.
This leads us to the second group of conflicts, those between EU law and National law.
Intuitively, the original purely economic function of the European Communities set up the stage for spurious conflicts between National and EU law: since States feature general aims to be pursued, including fundamental rights, while the EU had an exclusively economic function, VI conflicts arising between the two levels could easily derive from different grounds.
During the last fifty years, however, the deep structure of European law has evolved from its original conceptual roots. A succession of fundamental decisions issued by the ECJ starting from the late Sixties produced a corpus of rights to be respected at the supranational level (Weiler 1991 (Weiler : 2417 (Weiler -2419 (Weiler and 2437 (Weiler -2438 . These human rights were at the same time fundamental rights: they did not only represent a catalogue of moral claims regarding human nature and justice, they also represented a legal parameter that allowed for the scrutiny of supranational norms. They were employed as grounds for legality and were, in this sense, "fundamental" for the enactment and employment of supranational norms.
VII
This of course was at least in part strategically aimed at mitigating the disruptive effects of the "primacy" doctrine and sweeten the democratic deficit (ibid.: 2417). Moreover, some reberverating clashes between the ECJ and national constitutional courts, especially the Italian and the German ones, probably had a role in fostering this evolution too. The
Solange saga VIII and the progressive refinement of the Italian counter-limits doctrine IX forced the ECJ to develop a more and more refined set of fundamental rights to be protected right up to the EU level, as part of the "general principles of EU law". These were developed looking both at the "common constitutional traditions" and at the international conventions on human rights accepted by Member States, in particular the ECHR as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court. This process was eventually completed once the Charter of Fundamental Rights acquired legal value in the Lisbon Treaty: X this represented the final codification of EU fundamental rights and the clearest example of overlap between national and EU rights. Most of the rights we can read today in the Charter were already part of the ECJ's case law (Pizzorusso 2008: 9) . It is worth noting that the ECJ did not limit itself to "listing" the rights commonly shared by Member States but was creatively involved in a process of adaptation of the common traditions to the aims and the context of EU law (Cozzolino: 2003) . Sometimes this approach led the Court to a case by case, almost "nonchalant" cherry picking of the most suitable traditions, so that the value of "common constitutional traditions" turned out to be purely rhetorical. As a result, in some cases harsh reactions at the national level were brought about as in the famous Mangold case. XI Nevertheless, in other cases the ECJ actually looked at fundamental rights and principles shared among many European countries before employing it as grounds for European legality. Therefore, it is in general true that due to the "National" origin of EU fundamental rights, a common ground between the supranational and the national level was little by little developed. Consequently, a new kind of conflict between EU law and national law arose.
While conflicts based on different grounds, such as those between the fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, can be described as "conflicts by divergence" (CBDs), the new kind of conflicts are defined by the wording "conflicts by convergence" (CBCs) since a specific conflict has the same fundamental right as a basis.
The classical example of the kind of conflict at stake in a CBC is the Cordero Alonso 
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What is relevant for us is that both norms -the Spanish one denying compensation and the EU one conceding it -were grounded on the general principle of equality before the law. The interpretation of this principle given by the Spanish Constitutional Court allowed for this specific kind of discrimination, while the interpretation of the very same principle given by the European Court of Justice did not. Considering the principles of autonomy and primacy of EU law, the case was resolved by privileging EU legislation, but what is relevant for us is that different interpretations of the very same principle triggered different and conflicting legal consequences.
How can we conceptualize this kind of conflict? Is there something new that we can learn from this? Do we need new theoretical tools to handle the peculiar conflicts that the CBC embody? The next paragraphs will be devoted to answer these questions.
Complex Antinomies
In order to understand the conflicts at stake here the notion of "complex antinomy" has been used in scholarship. A brief analysis of this concept, as one of the attempts to tackle the issue, will be quite useful: it will allow to both enter deeper in the details of the problem and to figure out which problems remain to be fixed. Let us try to scrutinize this notion in detail. Here is the text that we are going to start from (Martinico 2014 (Martinico : 1350 
1351):
"In this sense, one could say that an antinomy is complex if it cannot be resolved by looking at the relations between legal orders: in other words, starting from the assumption of the prevalence of order A over order B, we cannot say that norm x always prevails over norm y because x belongs to order A while norm y succumbs because it belongs to order B. This occurs because in an integrated and interlaced system x and y could belong to both legal orders, A and B.
This situation is also characterized by the absence of a clear and univocal supremacy clause. The absence of univocal norms of collision influences the 'reducibility' and the 'resolvability' of the constitutional conflict in a multi-layered system. Looking at this scenario, multilevel constitutionalism in fact suffers from the absence of an unambiguous primacy clause. The antinomies can only be resolved on a case-bycase basis, and not by an unequivocal solution offered by a precise rule for collision norms (such as a clear and undisputed supremacy clause), because in a context like this a provision which seems to belong to the national level could actually be the repetition of another norm existing at international or supranational level".
Let us try to summarize this concept and capture its essential features. The interlaced structure of European Public law, where norms are extensively exchanged between EU and national legal systems, favours the emergence of particular conflicts that we call "complex antinomies". An antinomy is complex if and only if:
1) It is impossible to apply an intersystematic criterion according to which, if norm x belongs to A and norms y belongs to B, x trumps y in every possible circumstance thanks to A's prevalence over B. This simply happens because both norms belong to A and to B.
We will call this feature the Doppelganger problem.
2) There is no single criterion to solve the antinomy, once it has risen, or at least it is not a sufficiently clear-cut one. Thus, conflict can only be solved on a case by case base.
Again, this feature is considered as a consequence of the interlaced structure of norms in the European context ("because in a context like this a provision which seems to belong to the national level could actually be the repetition of another norm existing at international or supranational level").
We will call this feature the Primacy problem.
It will be argued that this notion underlines some crucial features of CBCs, especially the lack of ultimate rule of collision, but that it also needs some refinement, especially due to the norm-source distinction that should be considered. Let us begin with vices before moving to virtues.
The Doppelganger problem
First, the Doppelganger problem shall be examined, and in order to do that we will try a little thought experiment.
Let us imagine a very simple case: in legal system A there is a single legal authority creating new norms, call it A¹; similarly, B¹ is the only legislator in legal system B.
A¹ enacts the statute D¹ according to which "it is forbidden to drive faster than 50 km/h", while B¹ commands in statute D² that "it is allowed to drive faster than 50 km/h".
Suppose that no interpretive problem arises because of linguistic clarity, so that norm N¹ "it is forbidden to drive faster than 50 km/h" perfectly corresponds to the text D¹ and norm N² "it is allowed to drive faster than 50 km/h" corresponds to D² (interpretive E -75 isomorphism). Now suppose then that the intersystematic criterion C¹ "norms belonging to A prevail over norms belonging to B" is valid here (so that, for example, N¹ trumps N²).
Let us see what happens in a more complex and interlaced legal system in which norms belonging to A also belong to B and vice versa, such as in the European context here at stake.
a) One-sided overlap (A)
Suppose that A¹ enacts D² "it is allowed to driver faster than 50 km/h" and that, therefore, N² now also belongs to A. Then, N² belongs to both A and B, while N¹ only belongs to A. Thus we will have three norms: N 2A , N 2B , and N¹. Let us consider all possible combinations:
 N¹ and N² A : in legal system A the antinomy between N¹ and N² A and the consequent conflict whether it is allowed or forbidden to drive faster than 50 km/h will be solved by looking at some criteria to solve the antinomies that we can assume belong to A (lex superior, posterior, specialis etc). For instance, N¹ "it is forbidden to drive faster than 50 km/h" will be confronted to N² A "it is allowed to drive faster than 50 km/h" and the conflict will be solved according to, let us say, the lex superior criterion employed in legal system A. Alternatively, system A could lack criteria of this kind, so that the conflict would remain unsolved. In any case, all of this depends on the normative context typical of A. The inter-systematic criterion C¹ is irrelevant.
When we consider the relations between A and B, it goes: and it is actually quite rare in legal practice. As a consequence, the C¹ criterion would imply that officials are bound to give precedence to A-sources over Bsources. So, they would probably have to choose between slightly different sources, whose meaning (norms) could be partly different and perhaps conflict. Therefore, the irrelevance of the antinomy could quickly disappear.
b) One-sided overlap (B)
Suppose B¹ enacts D¹, so that "it is forbidden to driver faster than 50 km/h" is part of authoritative legal texts in B and N¹ "it is forbidden to driver faster than 50 km/h" also belongs to B. Thus we will have three norms: N¹ A , N 1B , and N². This situation is perfectly symmetrical to case considered in a) and the same consequences follow.
c) Two-sided overlap
Imagine that A¹ enacts D² and that B¹ enacts D¹ and suppose again that interpretive isomorphism is at work here, then we will have that both N¹ and N² belong to A and to B. As a result, either the C¹ criterion applies, or we face an apparent antinomy again. In any case, there is no circumstance in which the mere overlapping between legal systems A and B for itself forbids the application of the criterion C¹. What could happen is that interpretive isomorphism makes it irrelevant or, if interpretive isomorphism is not working, the C-criterion will become again relevant and applicable. Thus, the Doppelganger problem is not mistaken, it is simply a special case of a more general picture, featured by interpretive isomorphism. But it is for theory to consider the whole problem and this is what must be done here: we shall refine the analysis going beyond the special case.
The Primacy problem
Let us face the second defining feature of the notion of complex antinomy. It is the Primacy problem, i.e. the lack of any viable general norm of collision in cases of conflict between the two levels of norms. The point here is that, as a matter of fact, we do not have something as a C-criterion providing a stable and general solution to antinomies between interlocked legal systems. This situation can arise either because officials do not share a Ccriterion or because it is doubtful whether the relevant criterion is C¹ or C², C³, etc. But, as we have seen, this problem is linked to the interlaced relations between European legal systems.
There are probably two possible ways to make sense of this claim.
The first is the literal one according to which strictly speaking the lack of a single Ccriterion is caused by the interlocking, but this line of reasoning seems not to be compelling. It is certainly true that in a context like the European one the C-criterion is hardly clear, but that this depends on the overlap of similar or identical norms is more questionable. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, we can imagine a context in which two legal systems share some norms, but can still be coordinated by a C-criterion.
Moreover, the hard "resolvability" of complex antinomies turns out to be nothing more than its case by case method of resolution, which is typical of many other collisions of rules, such as fundamental rights conflict in the context of national constitutional norms (Zucca 2007: 54) . Thus, it is hard to consider it as a defining and essential feature of complex antinomies. 
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The second interpretation is the following: since the conflicting rules are "twins", a clear-cut conflicting rule would be useless. For instance, if principle N¹ is part of both A and B, no clear cut rule will ever be able to solve the conflict, simply because there is nothing to be solved: N¹ and N¹ cannot conflict because a rule cannot conflict with itself.
This interpretation seems to be more robust, but -as we have previously seen -holds only as long as interpretive isomorphism is at the field. N¹ can be an exact doppelganger only if the same wording is interpreted exactly in the same way or at least if interpretations are so similar that no conflict arise, but this is far from being necessary.
In a nutshell, it does not seem to be true that the interlocking of legal systems for itself entails that no C-criterion will be available to solve conflicts (first interpretation). It does not seem either to be useless because of this merging, apart from some marginal cases of perfect isomorphism (second interpretation). Again, the concept of "complex antinomy" is quite sound, but it seems to be created to explain some special cases where no interpretive problems arise. As a result, it emphasises and generalises the phenomenon of nonresolvability of conflicts that is likely to be quite circumscribed.
Conflicts by Convergence and Interpretive Disagreements
Let us try to summarize. As we saw, the overlap between national and supranational fundamental rights has determined conflicts of a new kind, between national and the supranational instances of the shared norm. For instance, if the principle of nondiscrimination (and the right not to be discriminate) is shared by the Spanish and the EU levels -such as in Cordero Alonso -the two could conflict in an unprecedented way.
Concepts like "complex antinomy" were thought sufficient to conceptualise the specificity of this phenomenon, but they are hardly capable of doing that mainly because they lack the essential distinction between norms and legal sources and between different levels of generality of norms. In other words, the very point of paragraph 3 was to underline that if we try to understand CBCs by means of a concept that does not consider:
a) that what is actually shared is a set of legal sources; and b) that legal principles can be specified in different ways; we are doomed to an incomplete understanding of the issue or at least we are forced to limit ourselves to some special cases. The analysis of the Thus, conflicts due to different interpretations of similar sources can be a feature of interlaced systems, and the difficulties in solving the antinomy will depend on the difficult acceptance of a shared general criterion to coordinate legal systems. Yet, there is something crucial in the concept of CBC and it is fundamentally correct to search for a conceptualization that does not limit itself to underline the unquestionable lack of an intersystematic C-criterion, XV but also considers the area of overlapping norms as the key to understand the issue. XVI An essential intuition in this sense is sketched in other paragraphs of the considered essay, for when describing the Cordero Alonso case, a different and probably more explicative lexicon is used, namely the concept of interpretive disagreement. XVII Trying to follow this line, I depart from concepts like "complex antinomy" and try to develop a different approach to the issue that puts some pressure on agreements/disagreements between the interpreters, in particular on interpretive disagreements. Therefore, the idea is that we can learn from the shortcomings of the approach previously considered and from the argument employed to underline them in paragraph 3. What we can learn is that a specific focus should be reserved to the normsource distinction, to the specification of norms, especially principles, and to the role (or lack) of C-criteria to coordinate legal systems.
The difficulties risen by the CBCs actually are problems of norms specification: XVIII a certain highly abstract and general norm has to be specified by means of interpretation.
Assuming that both A and B share a certain principle N¹ and that N¹ is exactly the same in Moreover, what A and B actually share is a set of raw legal materials, i.e. legal sources, XIX to be interpreted. XX Thus, different interpretations could already appear at this stage because of possible textual differences (Dolcetti -Ratti 2013: 314-317) . If this does not happen and the interpretation is the same -so that from the similar but not identical sources S¹ and S² the same N¹ is derived -then it is the specification of N¹ the could determine diverging interpretations. In a sense, the problem at stake here is more exactly a problem of sources/norms distinction: the lack of a detailed examination of this distinction is the reason why the "complex antinomy" doctrine remains confined to a special case.
As a result, we can define interpretive disagreements as "those situations where different and diverging doctrinal conceptions about the meaning of legal sources in a certain legal system are held by different participants" (Dolcetti -Ratti 2013: 307). These conflicts derive from preferences for certain interpretive methodologies held by the interpreters, which, in turn, derive from lato sensu ethical preferences and opinions XXI (at the meta-interpretative level).
In the situation we are dealing with, namely conflict over the interpretation and application of shared fundamental rights, conflict is often inevitable. XXII Quoting Torres Perez (2009: 11-12) on this topic:
"Given the typical, indeterminate language of fundamental rights clauses, they admit several interpretations. Moreover, fundamental rights embrace basic values for individuals and societies so that their meanings tend to be contested. Hence, the members of a community might reasonably disagree regarding fundamental rights' interpretation".
Therefore, due to both the semantic vagueness and ambiguity XXIII of fundamental rights language and to the fact that their role is crucial in contemporary societies, XXIV disagreements about them can easily emerge. Note that in the described circumstances disagreements can emerge, which means that in many other cases they could remain simply hidden. As Dolcetti and Ratti (2013: 318) put it:
"In our view, this line of argument is misleading in that from convergence on a certain set of particular solutions it infers that such solutions are univocally justified by means of the same interpretative and meta-interpretative standards. But that is a proposition which must be empirically proved, as our analysis suggests. Moreover, overlooking the fact that, legally, different courses of interpretation are available (mostly, in a diachronic perspective) obscures the fact that the common solution is merely a pro tempore 'conventionally right' solution".
In other words, mere convergence on a certain solution does not entail for itself agreement on the reasons for the solution: two interpretive methodologies M¹ and M² could easily converge on result N¹ and still be different. 
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Conversely, disagreement over the interpretation of a certain right does not necessarily entail conflict:
XXV for instance, the scope of application of the polities in which rights are applied could be different enough to prevent conflict, although this is probably more and more unlikely in contemporary Europe.
Relying on this framework, I argue that to explain the issue we need to employ the concept of "levels of disagreement". XXVI At an even deeper level, officials often disagree about meta-interpretative canons andat the end of the chain of justification -on some lato sensu ethical or ideological judgements that lie at the basis of legal ideologies. XXXI In other words, we agree that something counts as a legal source, but we cannot agree (1) on how to interpret it or (2) on how to specify it; both the agreement on sources and the disagreement on methods of interpretation/specification, in turn, depend on some broader ideological claims themselves interlocked in various ways.
As a result, the disagreement, that was temporarily set aside, immediately strikes back when we try to obtain particular outcomes, i.e. when we try to fix valid norms and apply Consequently, what distinguishes CBCs is their complex structure of convergence and disagreement: 1) deep disagreement on interpretive methodologies and on metainterpretive criteria; 2) disagreement on the C-criteria to solve antinomies between interpretive methodologies and uncertainty on the authority entitled to do that; 3) agreement on low-level principles and on a set of legal sources; 4) superficial disagreement on detailed outcomes.
Conflicts by Convergence today: the Taricco saga
What has been argued is far from being a set of abstract or hypothetical scenarios regarding constitutional conflicts in Europe. In this section I would like to argue that CBCs are right now at the centre of European Public law and represent a "hot topic" in scholarship.
In order to do that, I will focus on the recent Taricco saga that currently involves a tense confrontation between the ECJ and the Italian Constitutional Court and represents an example of CBC. This case clearly shows the relevance of CBCs in European studies, since it threatens the very fundamental roots of European law. The Taricco saga -as we will seecould perhaps involve the application of the "counter-limits" doctrine by the Italian Corte costituzionale, this way determining a harsh conflict between national and supranational level.
XXXV
As a preliminary remark, it shall be pointed out that the Taricco saga has been widely analysed and considered by both Italian and European scholars. XXXVI Therefore, here the scrutiny will be limited to a very specific point, namely the different interpretations given by the two courts to the very same principle, namely the principle of legality in criminal E -83 law. More in detail, the focus will be on the arguments offered by the courts in holding their views. This way the concept of "levels of disagreement" previously shaped will be considered in practice, to show how different views regarding interpretation can influence the judicial application of norms. In turn, the dependence of interpretive methodologies on broadly "ethical" claims hold by the interpreters will be underlined.
Factually, the saga regarded VAT fraud: the defendants were charged with setting up an organization in order to conduct fake trading of champagne. In particular, the company "Planet Srl" received fake returns from shell companies and wrote the VAT off. This way, Planet deceived the Italian treasury and, since part of VAT is an EU tax, the EU treasury too.
The crime had reached the stage of preliminary hearing before the Tribunale di Cuneo, but -due to the complexity of investigation and to some procedural delays -the court was fairly sure that no verdict could ever be reached before the expiration to the statutory limitation period, allowing for de facto impunity (Timmerman 2016: 780-781 ). Yet, the referring judge foresaw that this very short limitation period would determine systematic impunity of VAT frauds in Italy due both to the usual complexity of investigation in tax fraud matters and to the common three-stage, long-lasting structure of Italian criminal trials. Therefore, a potential conflict between Italian and EU law was at stake, according to the referring judge, since VAT is also an EU interest to be pursued by means of national As we can see, the ECJ recognises the principle of legality and the principle of proportionality as belonging to EU law, but the principle of legality is interpreted as merely requiring that punishable actions or omissions already constitute crimes under National law when committed. The principle of legality is not considered as also requiring the limitation period to act retroactively: disapplication of National law that merely shortened the limitation period would not represent a violation of EU fundamental rights, since these only entail that crimes are clearly identified as punishable when committed. On the other hand, the ECJ is worried by the risk of systematic violation of EU financial interests, as clearly stated in § 42:
" § 42. In the present case, it can be seen from the order for reference that the national legislation lays down criminal penalties for the offences at issue in the main proceedings, namely, inter alia, conspiracy to commit offences in relation to VAT and VAT evasion amounting to several million euros. Such offences constitute cases of serious fraud affecting the European Union's financial interests".
As a result, since the risk of huge financial loss would surely jeopardise both EU financial interests and the EU norms aimed at safeguarding them, national judge are required to dis-apply them. Moreover, once again, this would not put at risk the application of the principle of legality in criminal law, considered the limited meaning given to that norm by the ECJ.
Trying to sum up, the reasoning by the ECJ seemed to be grounded on three In particular, the interpretive reference was based on a doubt regarding the correct interpretation of article 325 TFEU: whether it prescribed the disapplication of internal norms on limitation periods even when this would jeopardise its degree of determinacy.
More specifically, according to the Court the notion of "considerable number of cases" is vague and it is impossible for a common citizen not trained in law to foresee the disapplication of favourable norms on time limitations on the ground of article 325 TFEU.
In turn, this doubt is based on the idea that the limitation period is grounded on the principle of legality in criminal law, as interpreted in the Italian legal system, and must therefore be perfectly clear and predictable. This principle is considered as part of the "untouchable core" of the Italian constitutional identity: therefore, it can never be disapplied, even when primacy of EU law is at stake: this is the core of the so called counter-limits doctrine. 
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What is interesting to the limited aims of this essay is the way in which this interpretation is advocated. The point through the eyes of the Italian Court is the meaning of the principle of legality in criminal law: where in the European interpretation of this norm (both by the ECJ and by the ECtHR), the principle of legality only entails that (1) criminal acts or omissions are clearly identified as crimes before the fact occurs and that (2) punishment is adequately identified, the principle in the Italian context has a broader meaning. Here the limitation period is considered as "part" of the punishment. In the vocabulary employed by the Italian Court, it is a "substantive" instead of merely "procedural" interpretation of the norm. The argumentation employed by the Court to ground this interpretation lies on two arguments:
1. Argument from substantive reasons: according to the Court (Considerato in diritto, § 4) the limitation period is part of the circumstances that determine whether someone will be punished or not. Thus, limitation is justified by the idea that punishment corresponds to a specific level of social threat and that the mere passing of the time is capable to lower this level. As a result, a right to forget the offence arises when sufficient time has passed. Therefore, punishment will not be applied anymore. If the punishment is not to be applied, then a sort of "negative" condition for the punishment is at stake: if something is capable to influence the application of the punishment both as a positive and as a negative condition, then this is part of the punishment itself and it shall be duly predictable and clearly stated. Thus, limitation is "covered" by the principle of legality too.
2. authoritative argument: another authoritative institution is close to this interpretation, namely the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional, so that the argument employed by the ECJ when relying on the ECtHR is somehow mirrored.
As a result, a different interpretation of the very same principle is on the ground. This is exactly the situation defined as a CBC.
Let us try to employ the idea of "levels of disagreement" to understand this conflict more in detail. Before we move in this direction, anyway, it is worth noting how the Taricco E -87 system. It is probably unnecessary to underline how relevant this can be in the eyes of scholarship.
So, let us move to the conceptualisation of the issue. In paragraph 4 we distinguished four levels of disagreement: 1) level of legal ideologies; 2) interpretive level; 3) low-level principles level; 4) detailed outcomes level. The Taricco conflict between the national and supranational levels actually fits this description. I would like to start from the lower level and then follow a "conceptual ascent" up to the more general one (Sunstein 2007: 18-20) .
The Taricco saga demonstrates a superficial disagreement on detailed norms regarding limitation: according to the CC, limitation shall be clear and predictable and modifications to the limitation regime cannot act retroactively if they imply negative consequences for convicted people. Thus, it is hardly acceptable that in order to apply EU law the diminished limitation period is again extended. For the ECJ, instead, there is no problem with the idea that in order to limit VAT frauds the limitation period will be extended again, although this was not perfectly clear and predictable.
This superficial disagreement depends on the different meaning given to a shared lowlevel principle, namely the already analysed principle of legality in criminal matters.
In turn, these interpretations of similar sources depend on the fact that whilst using the same sources, the interpreters accept and apply different interpretive methodologies: the ECJ privileges (1) a literal method, preventing enlargement of the scope of application of the legality principle, and (2) a teleological method, aimed at safeguarding EU financial interests; the Consulta, on the other hand, is driven by an evaluative, individual-based methodology according to which if some individual-rights goal is at stake (at least in criminal law), and if this can be promoted by one interpretation, then the source ought to be interpreted in that way (MacCormick-Summers 1991: 514).
It is worth noting that both of them also employ an authoritative argument, quoting those judges that share their view. However, depending on the Court you choose to quote, this argument seems to be available for both interpretations, XLIII and it seems to be unable to denote the specific features of each Courts' argumentation.
XLIV
Finally, all of this is grounded on different ethical premises (lato sensu), that lie at the last level of disagreement. As one can imagine, the literal-teleological interpretation employed by the ECJ seems to be linked to a certain commitment to a "europhile" ideology, where the supreme value to be pursued is the respect for the will of EU legislator (and here especially the drafters of the Treaties) and for the EU's aims and interests. Fundamental rights themselves are interpreted so that they do not collide with these values. In contrast, the CC seems to be more committed to an individual-based ideology, where the supreme value to be pursued is the limitation -to the greatest possible extent -of the use of criminal punishment towards citizens, even if this means a potential threat to public interests, such as financial ones. This way, by highlighting different arguments, privileging certain interpretive methodologies, and showing a certain "ideology", the two courts reveal -in a way -their own "concepts" of law. In other words, by disclosing their views on how a good judicial decision should be made, the courts are revealing their views on how -by means of certain interpretive directives -the argumentative "game" called law shall be made (La Torre 2002: 396-397) .
Conclusion
This essay was aimed at scrutinizing the concept of conflict by convergence and the jurisprudence that lies behind it.
It has been argued that in order to adequately conceptualise constitutional conflicts in
Europe it is actually fundamental to underline the interlaced structure of antinomies, namely the belonging of conflicting rules to more than one legal system. It has also been pointed out that the concept of "complex antinomy" is only able to describe this phenomenon in some specific cases in which interpretive disagreement is very low, so that two norms can be "twins" at the supranational and national level.
In order to describe the scenario in a more general way the concept of "levels of agreement/disagreement" in the law has been sketched. It has been pointed out that interpretive competition is mirrored by conflicts between interpretive methodologies held by officials and that these conflicts depend on even deeper disagreements on the metainterpretative and ultimately ideological reasons that guide the interpreters. As a result, the intermediate agreement on low-level principles or legal sources is not enough to prevent the emergence of superficial disagreement on detailed outcomes. Moreover, the fact that no ultimate criterion to solve interpretive and meta-interpretative disputes is available, since no ultimate authority is recognised in Europe, determines an ultimately irresolvable and never-ending constitutional conflict. 
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Put simply, the idea that constitutional conflict are central to the European context must become shared: these are probably inevitable, and maybe even "healthy", and in any case anyone who denies them is likely to be doomed not to catch the structure of the European legal system. The best way to conceptualise them, anyway, is to deepen and refine the promising notion of "disagreement caused by different interpretations". Here some broad lines of this task have been drawn by means of the concept of "levels of disagreement". Yet an interesting line of future research would be to go further and identify which kind of interpretive methodologies European and national judges prefer to use and why. The very brief analysis of the Taricco saga exemplifies this kind of task. This enterprise would be quite useful in order to understand why CBCs occur and why European scholarship should face these themes immediately, for very good reasons.
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